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i 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture attempted to lower distortions in 
the global agricultural markets.  However, the significant fall in commodity prices in late 
1990s may have reduced the incentives for both developed and developing countries to 
better integrate into the world markets.  This study analyzes price linkages and 
adjustment between developed and developing countries during the post-Uruguay Round 
period.  Prices of two key commodity markets, long-grain rice and medium-hard wheat, 
are assembled for major exporters and producers. Results from the multivariate 
cointegration analysis suggest partial market integration between developed and 
developing countries in the post-Uruguay Round period.  Developed countries are found 
to be price leaders in these two markets, and in most cases, the changes in their prices 
have relatively large impacts on those of the developing countries.  The new entrants into 
world markets (Vietnam and Argentina) have faced considerable price adjustment due to 
changes in the developed countries prices.   
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POST-URUGUAY ROUND PRICE LINKAGES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
THE CASE OF RICE AND WHEAT MARKETS 
 
Navin Yavapolkul1, Munisamy Gopinath,2 and Ashok Gulati3 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) in 1994 initiated multilateral 
reform of the agricultural sector to better integrate global markets.  The current Doha 
Developmental Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) expects to deepen the 
reforms of the URAA despite the setbacks at Cancun, Mexico.  However, significant 
differences between the views of developed and developing countries persist on market 
access, export subsidies and domestic support (IFPRI Forum, 2003; The Economist, 
2003; The World Bank, 2003; The WTO, 2003; New York Times, 2003).  For instance, 
the reform of the domestic support policies of developed countries, especially the 
increasing use of income support and its effects on global commodity prices, has been a 
key component of developing countries proposals to WTO. 
Simultaneously, commodity prices have fallen significantly after a peak during 
1995-1997.  In the case of long-grain rice, for example, fob prices at US gulf ports fell 
from a high of $300/ton in early 1997 to about $120/ton by 2001 (Economic Research 
Service, US Department of Agriculture).  Similar, but less stark trends have been 
observed for wheat, soybeans, cotton and corn.  Many countries maintain domestic or 
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trade policies, which protect or safeguard their farmers from declining world market 
prices.  The United States maintains price floors or loan rates for major commodities, 
which are supported by (loan) deficiency payments.  Several developing countries have 
bound tariffs on agricultural commodities, which have allowed them to raise applied 
tariffs to counter the decline in world market prices. 
The key question we address in this paper is whether price linkages exist between 
developed and developing countries in two key commodity markets  long-grain rice and 
hard wheat  in the post-URAA era.  In addition, if such linkages exist, how have the 
commodity prices of developed countries impacted those of their developing counterparts 
and vice versa?  Have developed or developing countries adjusted the most to world 
market changes during the second half of the 1990s?  Answers to these questions have 
important implications for the current round of trade negotiations.  The partial or full 
integration of commodity markets between developed and developing countries in an era 
of significant price decline can confirm channels for the transmission of a countrys 
policies into other countries.  If the adjustment to declining world prices were to fall 
disproportionately on one set of countries, it would affect price stability, income and 
welfare of their agricultural households.  If agriculture is a key foreign exchange earner, 
the adjustment would affect also the overall economy.   
Prior to distinguishing our effort from other studies, note that we define a spatially 
integrated market in the spirit of Stigler (1969) as the area within which the price of a 
good tends to uniformity, allowances being made for transportation cost.  This condition 
is generally consistent with the weak version of law of one price (LOP), which states that 
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a linear and proportional relationship exists between prices of two markets.  While the 
definition of market integration is a common feature between our study and prior 
investigations (Mohanty, Peterson and Smith, 1996; Taylor et al., 1996; Goodwin , 1992a 
and 1992b),4 we differ from the latter by focusing on developed and developing countries 
in the post-URAA era of declining commodity prices (Yang et al., 2000).  We also focus 
on Granger-type causality among prices and the adjustment by individual country prices 
to stay in these relationships. 
The long-grain rice and hard wheat markets are selected because they have 
significant participants from developed and developing countries.  The countries chosen 
for the rice market analysis are the United States, Thailand, Vietnam and India, while 
those for the wheat market include the United States, Canada, Australia, Argentina and 
India.  The choice on countries and commodities depended also on data availability and 
comparability.  Monthly price data from 1996/1997 to 2002 have been assembled for this 
purpose.  A vector error correction process, which allows for the identification of 
cointegration or long-run price equilibrium/relationship, is estimated for each of the two 
markets.  We tested the possibility of perfect integration/arbitrage, and the magnitude of 
adjustment of individual country prices to stay on the long-run relationships.  Finally, 
impulse response analyses based on directed graphs are carried out to track the short- and 
long-term responses of prices to economic shocks. 
                                                 
4Spatial competitive equilibrium and market integration are not interchangeable concepts.  This studys 
interpretation of market integration is similar to that of Ravallion (1987), who noted, one can be 
interested in testing empirically for spatial market integration, without wishing to rest the case for or 
against Pareto optimality on the outcome.  Measurement of market integration can be viewed as basic data 
for an understanding of how specific markets work.  See also Dawson and Key (2002). 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
This section briefly describes a vector error correction model (ECM) to identify 
the cointegrating vectors in the rice and wheat markets.  The procedures to specify and 
test the ECM, and to identify the cointegrating vectors and the adjustment coefficients are 
also outlined in the following section. More details on the procedures and tests can be 
found in Johansen (1995). 
2.1 NON-STATIONARY PROCESS AND COINTEGRATION 
Time-series data are tested for stationarity, which means each observation of the 
data independently takes on a single random event.  Stationary data have stable and 
observable mean and variance, but most economic time series including commodity 
prices fail to satisfy this criterion.  Non-stationary data have a strong trend and their mean 
and variance shift overtime reflecting changes in the data generating process  (Granger 
and Newbold, 1974).  A non-stationary process is said to be integrated of order d, 
referred to as I(d), if  first differencing for d times produces a stationary process.  
Stationary processes are simply denoted as I(0).   
Given two I(1) series, a linear combination of these two series is generally I(1).  
If, however, there exists a linear combination of the two series that is I(0) then the two 
series are cointegrated.  Alternatively, non-stationary series of a common order are said 
to be cointegrated, if there exists one or more linear combinations, which transform the 
series to a stationary system.   
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2.2 MULTIVARIATE COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS 
To establish long-run equilibrium relationships among prices in a multivariate 
context, we draw on Johansen and Juselius (1988 and 1990) multivariate cointegration 
technique. It begins with the description of a vector autoregressive model (VAR) model, 
where a vector of prices ( 1p× ) at time t are related to vectors of past prices. The VAR 
model at time t can be written as: 
 
  Pt = Π1 Pt-1 + Π2 Pt-2 ++ Πk Pt-k + µ + ΦDt +εt   (2.1)  
 
where t = 1, , T, denotes the number of observations.  Pt is a vector of  dimension 
( 1)p×  corresponding to the number of price series.  The matrix Πq (q = 1,,k) has a 
( )p p×  dimension corresponding to an autoregressive relationship with its own past 
values and other lagged variables in the system.  Parameter µ is a constant term and 
variable Dt denotes centered, seasonal dummies which sum to zero over the sample 
period. 
If all prices are I(1), equation (2.1) can be rewritten in first differences as: 
 
 ∆Pt = Г1 ∆Pt-1 + Г 2 ∆Pt-2 ++ Г k-1 ∆Pt-k+1 + ΠPt-k + µ + ΦDt +εt,  (2.2)  
 
where Гj = -( I - Π1 - Π2 -- Πj ) for j = 1,, k-1, and Π = -( I - Π1 - Π2 -- Πk ) are p x 
p matrices of parameters.  This model of first differences is often referred to as a vector 
error correction process or model (ECM).  The Гj are parameter matrices summarizing 
short-run relationships among the prices.  The Π matrix contains the long-run parameters 
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and 3 cases of it are feasible: (i) Π has full rank, which indicates that the process Pt is 
stationary and thus the VAR representation in levels is appropriate; (ii) Π has rank zero, a 
null matrix containing no long-run information (no cointegration); and (iii) the rank of Π 
is r, where 0<r<p, and the system is said to have cointegrating rank r.  In this case, there 
exists two ( )p r×  matrices α and β, such that αβ′Π = . The Π matrix can be decomposed 
into the cointegration vector, β, and the adjustment coefficients, α. 
To determine the rank of П we require its ordered eigenvalues 1 ... pλ λ> > , which 
can be derived as solutions to the equation: 
1
0 00 0 0kk k kS S S Sλ
−− =
    (2.3)
 
where  
• 1
1
n
ij it jt
i
S T R R−
=
′= ∑   for (i,j= 0,k) and ijS is a p p×  matrix of residual product.   
• R0t and Rkt are p-dimensional vector of residuals from the regression of ∆Pt on Zt, 
and Pt-k on Zt, respectively, corresponding to tth observation and kth lag: 
   
1
0
1 1
T T
t t t t t t t
t t
R P PZ Z Z Z
−
= =
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞′ ′= ∆ − ∆⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑       
   
1
1 1
T T
kt t k t k t t t t
t t
R P P Z Z Z Z
−
− −
= =
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞′ ′= − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑    (2.4) 
This procedure allows testing the cointegration rank (r) sequentially from zero to (p-1).  
The likelihood ratio (LR) or trace test statistic for the null hypothesis (H2)  that the rank 
of П is less than or equal to r  is given as: 
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0
2
2 1
1
2 ln( ; | ) ln(1 )
p
trace i
i r
Q H H Tλ λ
= +
= − ≡ − −∑ ,   (2.5) 
where 2iλ are the solutions to the eigenvalue problem in (2.3) under H2. The alternative 
hypothesis, H1, denotes no cointegrating vectors, i.e., ,r p=  meaning П has full rank.  
The trace test statistic is distributed as a modified chi-square with (p-r) degree of 
freedom, whose critical values are provided by Johansen and Juselius (1990).  
 Before applying the multivariate cointegration technique two specification issues 
are considered: the deterministic components of the ECM (intercepts and dummies) and 
the lag length.  The LR tests for the deterministic components are outlined in Johansen 
and Juselius (1990, 1992, and 1994), and Johansen (1988). The determination of lag 
length based on a residual analysis and a LR ratio test  is presented in Johansen (1995).   
 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The production and export of rice and wheat are concentrated in a few developed 
and developing countries.  In this section, a description of prices used in the cointegration 
analysis is presented. 
3.1 RICE MARKET 
The international rice market is often described as thin, volatile, risky, and 
concentrated with a few major exporters (Child, 2001). The six major rice exporters are 
Thailand, Vietnam, US, India, China, and Pakistan, respectively accounting for 27.5, 
16.1, 11.8, 10.9, 9.0, and 8.3 percent of world exports (1996-2002 average, Foreign 
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Agricultural Service, USDA).  The major world rice producers are China and India 
respectively accounting for 33.1 and 22.1 percent of share of world production (1996-
2002 average, Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA), while the combined share of 
Thailand, Vietnam and the US is only 10.7 percent.  Thus, international rice prices are 
likely determined by world supply and stocks.  
International trade in rice is subject to a high degree of product differentiation. 
Two important attributes of rice are often emphasized percent-broken and type of grain. 
The percent broken indicates the quality of the milling process and, therefore, the lower 
percent-broken carries a premium.  Four types of rice are traded worldwide: indica, 
japonica, aromatic, and glutinous.  We chose indica rice for our study since it accounts 
for about 75 percent of global rice trade annually.  An ideal study of rice market 
integration would include all six rice exporters. However, two countries, Pakistan and 
China, could not be included in our study.  Given the focus on post-URAA era, i.e., post-
1995, sufficient observations are required to establish the asymptotic properties of ECMs 
parameter estimates.  The use of monthly price data rules out Pakistan, whose price data 
contain several no quote (missing) observations due to a significant drop in exports 
(USDA Rice Yearbook, 2002).  Although China imports indica rice, the sparsely 
available monthly export price data are of poor quality.   
The data sample contains 65 observations during the period of August, 1997 to 
December, 2002.  The US price series is long grain No. 2 broken (not to exceed 4 
percent), FOB Gulf milled at Houston, Texas.  The data are based on monthly average of 
the midpoint for reported weekly low and high quotes.  Thailand rice price is 100% 
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Grade B, Thai white milled rice, calculated by simple average of weekly price quote, 
including cost of bags. There is evidence that long-grain indica rice from these regions 
are close substitutes. Brorsen et al., (1984) studied the dynamic relationships of rice 
import prices in Europe and concluded that US and Thai rice of this type are close 
substitutes.  The 5% broken milled rice for both Vietnamese and Indian price series are 
often chosen to compare with the two prior series.5  Thus, the selected Vietnamese and 
Indian price are 5% broken fob vessel at Ho Chi Minh City and Bombay port, 
respectively, and simple averages of weekly price quotes.  Figure 1 presents a time series 
of the rice markets prices. 
Figure 1Time series of international rice prices  
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5Due to non-availability of the Vietnamese data for 1996, the 1997-2002 period is chosen.  Sources: Thai 
rice: weekly price reports, US Embassy, Bangkok; US rice: Rice Market News, Agricultural Marketing 
Service, USDA; Vietnamese rice: Vietnam Industry source, Saigon; India: the Creed Rice Market Report, 
Creed Rice Co., Inc., Houston, Texas. 
Note: all prices are expressed in terms of natural logarithms. 
Source: Complied by author. 
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3.2 WHEAT MARKET 
The world export of wheat is approximately 105 million tons each year, much 
larger than the 22 million tons of rice exports.  Eighteen percent of the world production 
of wheat is annually traded, ranked second among agricultural commodities (USDA 
Wheat Yearbook, 2002).  There are a large number of wheat suppliers, but almost 80 
percent of exports come from five major exporting countries  the US (26.1%), Canada 
(15.7%), Australia (14.8%), EU (13.9%) and Argentina (10.1%).  Similar to the case of 
rice, some of the major wheat producers mostly serve domestic demand. China, EU, and 
India, account for 18.1, 16.9, and 11.9 of the world production, respectively (Foreign 
Agricultural Service, USDA). 
The main criterion used for classifying wheat is hardness, which is a milling 
characteristic determined by the protein content.  The hardest varieties produce elastic 
dough appropriate for blending with lower-protein wheat to produce bread flour.  Soft 
wheat with lowest protein content is milled into flour used for cakes, pastries, cookies 
and crackers.  Highly specialized durum wheat is used to produce coarse flour for pasta 
(Ghoshray, Lloyd and Rayner, 2000; USDA Wheat Yearbook 2002).  Veeman (1987), 
Wilson (1989) and Alston et al., (1994) pointed out that product characteristics and end 
uses vary by wheat type and so, any analysis treating all wheat as a homogeneous 
commodity would provide misleading results (Larue, 1991).  
In this study, hard/medium hard wheat prices from US, Argentina, Canada, 
Australia, and India are analyzed.  Thus, only wheat varieties for making bread are 
considered, which eliminates EU, a soft-wheat exporter. Chinas wheat price series are 
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not available on a monthly basis.  Monthly data used in this study cover the period April, 
1996 to February, 2002, with 71 observations. The price series are for of US No.2 Hard 
Red winter, 12.5 % protein (FOB from Gulf port); high protein No.1 Canadian Western 
Red Spring wheat, 13.5% protein (FOB from St. Lawrence port); Argentinean Trigo Pan 
(FOB from Buenos Aires); Australian Standard White wheat, which contains lower 
protein content. The price data for India are Common Spring bread wheat at wholesale 
level (near ports) since FOB data are not readily available.  Any remaining quality 
differences can be captured using the intercept in the ECM.  Figure 2 presents the wheat 
markets price series. 
 
Figure 2Time series of international wheat prices 
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 Note: all prices are expressed in terms of natural logarithms. Source: Complied by author. 
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4. RESULTS  
This section describes the empirical results from the cointegration analysis.  The results 
of the non-stationarity and specification tests are presented in appendix 1 and 2.  The 
Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results in Appendix 1 show that every 
price included in our study is an I(1) process. For both markets, the lag length of ECM is 
6 (Appendix 2). 
4.1 COINTEGRATION RANK 
The trace test results ( traceλ ) from equation (2.5) are presented in table 1 for rice 
and wheat markets.  For each market, two specifications of the ECM with and without an 
intercept, case I and II respectively, are estimated.  In most studies, the first failure to 
reject the null hypothesis by the trace test, given the testing order 0 to (p-1), is sufficient 
to identify the cointegrating rank (Goodwin, 1992a, 1992b; Brester and Goodwin, 1993; 
Mohanty et al., 1996; Taylor et al., 1996; Ismet, et al., 1998; Bierlen et al., 1998; Dawson 
and Key, 2001). Results in table 1 indicate that the rice and wheat markets contain one 
and two cointegrating vectors, respectively.  Additional testing indicated evidence of an 
intercept in the ECM (linear trends in level data), case I, which can account also for 
transfer costs/quality differences in the prices (Dawson, 2002).  The cointegrating rank 
(r) gives the number of stationary linear combinations of the price data, i.e., cointegrating 
vectors.  Market integration is a linear and proportional relationship between prices, and 
thus, is consistent with the identification of at least one linear combination of prices that 
exhibits stability over time.   
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Table 1Trace tests and Maximum Eigenvalue Tests for Rice and Wheat 
 
  Case 1 (linear trend in level) H2 /1  Case II (no linear trend in level) H*2/2 
  λ  trace test λ  trace (0.95) Decision  
λ * trace 
test 
λ * trace 
(0.95) 
Decision 
The rice data (T-k=59 observation)     
r = 0  58.66 47.18 Reject  76.34 53.35 Reject 
r ≤ 1  14.66 29.51 Fail to Reject  28.08 35.07 Fail to Reject 
r ≤ 2  4.17 15.20 Fail to Reject  9.38 20.17 Fail to Reject 
r ≤ 3  0.29 3.96 Fail to Reject  1.00 9.09 Fail to Reject 
The wheat data (T-k=65 observation)     
r = 0  106.05 68.91 Reject  124.35 75.33 Reject 
r ≤ 1  53.85 47.18 Reject  69.46 53.35 Reject 
r ≤ 2  17.80 29.51 Fail to Reject  32.99 35.07 Fail to Reject 
r ≤ 3  7.19 15.20 Fail to Reject  10.03 20.17 Fail to Reject 
r ≤ 4  2.34 3.96 Fail to Reject  2.41 9.09 Fail to Reject 
1 The critical values of traceλ  are taken from Johansen (1995, table 15.3). 
2 The critical values of *traceλ  are taken from Johansen (1995, table 15.2). 
 
The estimated p-dimensional matrix П under H2 (equation 2.2) contains two types 
of linear combinations  stationary and non-stationary. The cointegrating rank indicates 
the number of stationary combinations (r). Since non-stationary combinations are 
trending, they are referred to as common trends ( ).p r−   Studies of market integration 
commonly agree that a perfect integrated (strong LOP) system of prices should contain 
only one common trend and ( 1)p −  long-run relationships for all possible combinations 
of prices.  The reason is that ( 1)p −  cointegrating vectors provide stronger support for 
the concept of a single international price. A single cointegrating vector implies that any 
single price can be solved for in terms of the other (p-1) prices. Thus, if one price in the 
system is fully representative of the set of p prices, then one would expect to find 
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( 1)p − cointegrating vectors (Goodwin, 1992b).  However, if more than one common 
trend is found or if the number of cointegrating vectors is less than ( 1),p −  the market is 
said to be partially integrated.  For instance, Goodwin (1992a) suggests that the 
international wheat market may be partially integrated since he found only one 
cointegrating vector among prices of the US, Canada, Australia, EU, and Japan. 
 
4.2 COINTEGRATING VECTORS AND ADJUSTMENT PARAMETERS 
Recall that the solution to the problem in equation (2.3) yields the estimated П 
matrix as a product of two matrices, 2 2 α β ′Π = and the ordered eigenvalues 2 21 ... pλ λ> > , 
where the superscript 2 refers to the solution under H2.  The corresponding eigenvectors 
are given by 2 2 2 21 2   ( , ,..., )pV v v v= , where 
2iv  is a normalized  p-dimensional vector such 
that 2 2 kkV S V′ =I.   Once the cointegrating rank (r) is identified from the trace test, the 
first r columns of  2V become the cointegrating vectors, i.e., ( )2 2 21  ,..., rv vβ = , while the 
matrix 2 20  kSα β=  represents the adjustment coefficients.  For the rice market: 
( ) ( )2 2 31.92 49.56 60.35 23.16 ; 0.005 0.003 0.017 0.005 ,β α= − − = − −′ ′  
and the estimated 2 2 MLE α β ′Π =  is given by: 
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[ ]
* * * *
-0.15 -0.24 0.29 0.11
(-1.47) (-1.47) (1.47) (1.47)
0.005 0.09 0.14 -0.17 -0.06
(1.01) (1.01) (-1.01) (-1.01)-0.003 -31.92 -49.56 60.35 23.16
-0.017 0.54 0.84 -1.02 -0.39
(4.91) (4.91) (-4.91) (-4.91)0.005
-
MLEΠ
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥= =
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
* * * *0.15 -0.23 0.28 0.11
(-2.26) (-2.26) (2.26) (2.26)
,
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (4.1) 
where the t-statistics are listed in parenthesis and the significance of the parameters at the 
5% level in  MLEΠ  is indicated by an asterisk (Johansen, 1995b). 
According to the trace test, there are two cointegrating vectors (  2r = ) in the 
wheat data: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2
1 1
2 2
2 2
 55.05 20.48 36.54 26.32 15.08 ; 0.011 0.024 0.010 0.009 0.008
 100.18 29.71 52.20 130.70 13.43 ; 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.008 0.016
β α
β α
= − − = − − − −
= − − = − − − − −
′ ′
′ ′
 
Thus, 
2
12 2
1 1
2
2

  ( )
MLE
β
α α
β
⎛ ⎞′
⎜ ⎟Π =
⎜ ⎟′⎝ ⎠
is given  by: 
-0.011 -0.010
-0.024 -0.010
-55.05 20.48 36.54 26.32 -15.08
-0.010 -0.002
-100.18 -29.71 52.20 130.70 13.43
-0.009 -0.008
0.008 -0.016

MLE
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤Π = ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
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1.58 * 0.08 0.91* 1.58 * 0.03
(5.64) (0.90) ( 5.80) ( 4.84) (0.52)
2.35 * 0.18 1.41* 1.99 * 0.22 *
(5.23) ( 1.26) ( 5.64) ( 3.78) (2.77)
0.79 * 0.15 * 0.49 * 0.55 * 0.13 *
(4.63) ( 2.80) ( 5.19) ( 2.79) (4.28)
1.30 * 0.06
(4.23) (0.57)
− −
− −
− − −
− − −
− − −
− − −
=
0.75 * 1.28 * 0.03
( 4.36) ( 3.59) (0.50)
1.20 * 0.65 * 0.57 * 1.93 * 0.34 *
(3.03) (5.16) ( 2.55) ( 4.16) ( 4.83)
− −
− −
− − −
− − −
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
,     (4.2) 
where the t-statistics are listed in parenthesis and asterisk indicates statistical significance 
(5%). 
4.3 STRUCTURAL HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
The  MLEΠ  matrices for both rice and wheat model [equation (4.1) and (4.2)] show 
that some of the coefficients of β and α  matrices might not be statistically different from 
zero.  If some coefficients of β and α  matrices are zero, it would affect both that 
stationary and non-stationary linear combinations of price data.  For example, if the first 
of element of 2β ′ in the rice model is zero, it suggests that country 1s price does not 
enter the cointegrating vector and therefore, is not a part of the spatial price linkage.  
Moreover, within the β  matrix some coefficients might be proportional to each other.  
For instance, if 21β and 
2
3
β  are equal to 1 and 1 in the rice market, respectively, prices of 
countries 1 and 3 have a one-to-one relationship, i.e., perfect arbitrage.  Geographical 
proximity (e.g., Thailand and Vietnam) may suggest the existence of such one-to-one 
 17
relationship due to lower transport costs.  Therefore, three types of hypotheses onβ  and 
α  matrices are of interest.   
4.3.1 Exclusion/Zero Restrictions 
The first set of hypothesis onβ , denoted as H3, take the form 2 0pβ =  for p=1,4 
for rice and 2 0prβ =  for p=1,,5 and r = 1, 2 for wheat ( r is the number of cointegrating 
vectors).  Here we are interested in identifying whether or not all prices series enter the 
long-run equilibrium.  Non-excludability of the pth price series indicates its 
inclusion/relevance in the spatial price relationship.  Since the wheat market contains 2 
cointegrating vectors, the pth exclusion restriction is a joint test on the pth coefficient in 
both vectors.  That is, 23 .5: 0H β =  hypothesizes that the fifth element of both 
cointegration vectors, 21β
′ and 22β
′  is zero.   
The exclusion restriction on β correspond to the null hypothesis of 23 :H Hβ ϕ=  
where H is a known matrix of dimension ( )p s×  with rank s and ϕ  is a ( )s r× matrix of 
unknown parameters.  Given r s p≤ ≤ , the LR test is given by: 
0 3
3 2 2
1
(1 )2 ln( ; | ) ln
(1 )
i
i i
Q H H T
γ λ
λ=
⎧ ⎫−⎪ ⎪− = ⎨ ⎬−⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑    (4.3) 
 
where 3iλ  and 
2
iλ are respectively, the ith eigenvalue calculated under H3 and H2 
(Johansen, 1995) .  The LR test statistic is distributed as 2( ) ,r p sχ −  which equal 
2
1(4 3)χ − for 
rice and 22(5 4)χ −  for wheat.  Table 2 shows that every null hypothesis of zero coefficient in 
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the cointegrating vector(s) is rejected, indicating that each of the rice and wheat prices is 
relevant for the respective long-run relationships in the two markets (weak LOP).   
 
Table 2Exclusion Restrictions on ∃ in the Rice and Wheat Model 
 
Rice Model  Wheat Model 
 Null Hypothesis LR/1   Null 
Hypothesis/2 
LR/3 
US H31: ∃11 = 0 28.48 Reject  US H31: ∃.1 = 0 21.45 Reject 
Thailand H31: ∃21 = 0 9.95 Reject  Argentina H31: ∃.2 = 0 17.01 Reject 
Vietnam H31: ∃31 = 0 16.18 Reject  Canada H31: ∃.3 = 0 18.90 Reject 
India H31: ∃41 = 0 30.64 Reject  Australia H31: ∃.4 = 0 18.08 Reject 
     India H31: ∃.5 = 0 33.04 Reject 
1 2
(1)χ  at 0.05 level of significance is 3.84. 
2 Denotes column vectors corresponding to the respective element of the two co-integrating vectors. 
3 2
(2)χ  at 0.5 level of confidence is 5.99. 
 
4.3.2 Proportionality Restrictions 
The cointegration results in section IV.1 indicated that rice and wheat markets 
appear to be partially integrated in the sense that there exists less than ( 1)p −  linear and 
stable relationships among prices.  This result, however, doesnt rule out the possibility 
that any two prices within a market may exhibit a one-to-one relationship, i.e., unit 
proportionality, which implies perfect arbitrage between the two countries. It is possible 
for instance, that geographical proximity between Thailand and Vietnam may lead to unit 
price proportionality between the two countries in the rice market.  Some prior studies of 
wheat market integration have tested unit price proportionality between US and Canadian 
prices (Goodwin, 1992a, 1992b; Mohanty et al., 1996).  Therefore, pair-wise 
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proportionality is hypothesized for all possible price pairings and the results of the 
corresponding LR tests are presented in table 3. 
The calculated LR test statistics for the rice and wheat model, respectively, reject 
the null hypothesis of proportionality at the 0.05 significance level. Although perfect 
arbitrage condition seems to be likely between Thai and Vietnamese rice price, it is not 
valid statistically.  In an earlier study there was evidence of Thailand-US unit 
proportional movement prior to URAA, but it is not detected in our study (Taylor et al., 
1996; Bierlen, Wailes, and Cramer 1998). 
Unlike the rice market, the international price linkage in wheat market is 
described by two cointegrating vectors, which span the cointegration space. The 
exclusion and proportionality restrictions above are joint tests of the respective elements 
of both cointegrating vectors.  Thus, in the wheat model, these tests assume that the two 
vectors contain the same information.  It might be the case that each of these two 
cointegrating vectors represents a distinct relation in the cointegration space. For the 
wheat model, the exclusion and proportionality can be tested in each of the cointegrating 
vectors.  Repeating all of the hypotheses in sections IV.3.1-2 for each of the cointegrating 
vectors, we arrived at:  
1
5
1 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
H −
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥
= ⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, and 25
1 0
0 0
0 1
1 0
0 0
H =
−
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
,   
where 15H  and 
2
5H  are restriction matrices for the first and second wheat cointegrating 
vector, respectively.  The matrix 15H  imposes (i) US-Canadian price proportionality and 
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(ii) zero restriction on Australian price.  The matrix 25H  imposes (iii) zero restriction on 
Argentinean and Indian prices, and (iv) US-Australian price proportionality, while 
Canadian price is unrestricted. These linear restrictions are expressed in terms of 
5 1 1 2 2
5 5 5 5 5: ( , )H H Hβ ϕ ϕ=  where 
1
5ϕ  and 
2
5ϕ  are parameters to be estimated, corresponding 
to each cointegrating vector.  The LR test statistic, distributed as 2χ with 3 degree of 
freedom, is given by: 
( )5 22 ln ; | 86.24 81.62 4.62Q H H− = − = , 
which suggests failure to reject the null hypothesis ( 15H  and 
2
5H ) at the 0.05 significance 
level.   
Note that pairwise proportionality involving one price each from developed and 
developing countries is not found in rice and wheat markets.  These results further 
confirm partial integration between developed and developing countries in rice and wheat 
markets and that strong LOP does not hold.  Other studies have often cited informational 
inefficiencies in international commodity markets as a reason for partial integration.  In 
our case, however, the significant changes in the policy regimes of developed and 
developing countries in the post-URAA era may be a reason for our results.  Developed 
economies have switched from price support to income support and price floors, while 
developing countries have continued to use tariffs for protection.  A fall in world price, 
triggered by any exporter, may then cause increased support payments in developed 
economies possibly adding to further price declines.  However, developing countries may 
 21
have raised tariff barriers within the bounds imposed by the URAA suggesting partial and 
weakening integration between its and developed countries markets.   
4.3.3 Weak Exogeneity Restrictions 
The third hypothesis relates to linear restrictions on α , which take the form 
2
4 :H Aα ψ= , where A is a ( )p m×  restriction matrix, ,r m p≤ ≤ and ψ  is a matrix of 
unknown parameters.  The hypothesis here is that some of the coefficients in 2α ′ in 
section IV.2 are equal to zero.  In the context of wheat market, as noted in section IV.3.1, 
2
4 .1: 0H α =  hypothesizes that the first element of both adjustment vectors,
2
1α ′and 
2
2α ′ is 
zero, which implies that the cointegrating relations do not enter the ith equation.  For 
example, if 2.1α  is statistically not significant from zero, it would indicate that country 1s 
price doesnt adjust to any shocks to other prices in the system.  Essentially, this is a test 
of weak exogeneity of country 1s price, P1t.  For H4, the LR test statistic takes the form:  
0 4
4 2 2
1
(1 )2ln( ; | ) ln
(1 )
i
i i
Q H H T
γ λ
λ=
⎧ ⎫−⎪ ⎪− = ⎨ ⎬−⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑     (4.4) 
where 4iλ and 
2
iλ are respectively, the ith eigenvalue calculated under H4 and H2.  
The LR test statistic is distributed as 21(4 3)χ −  and
2
2(5 4)χ −  for the rice and wheat model, 
respectively. 
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Table 4 shows that the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity cannot be rejected at 
the 0.05 significance level individually for Thailand and Indian prices in the rice model.  
However, p-value of the test statistic for US price is 0.03.  As type I error is reduced to 
0.01, the weak exogeneity hypothesis of the US price is not rejected.  These results are 
also consistent with the t-statistics of the maximum likelihood estimator of  MLEΠ  in 
equation (4.1), where all coefficients of level variables in the US and Thailand equation 
are not significant.  For the wheat model, the null hypotheses of weak exogeneity of all 
prices in both cointegration vectors are rejected. 
 
Table 4Weak Exogeneity Tests for the Rice and Wheat Model 
 
Rice Model  Wheat Model 
 Null Hypothesis LR/1  Null Hypothesis/2 LR/3 
US H4 : 1α  = 0 4.65 Fail to Reject US H4: .1α  = 0 27.45 Reject 
Thailand H4: 2α  = 0 0.99 Fail to Reject  Argentina H4: .2α  = 0 27.48 Reject 
Vietnam H4: 3α  = 0 18.66 Reject Canada H4: .3α  = 0 30.93 Reject 
India H4: 4α  = 0 1.77 Fail to Reject Australia H4: .4α  = 0 16.37 Reject 
    India H4: .5α  = 0 20.49 Reject 
 
1 2
(1)χ  at 0.05 level of significance is 3.84; 2 Denotes column vectors corresponding to the respective 
element of the two co-integrating vectors; 3 2(2)χ  at 0.5 level of confidence is 5.99. 
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4.4 FINAL LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM/RELATIONSHIP 
The structural hypotheses results are used to derive rice and wheat markets final 
long-run price relationships.  The final estimated  MLEΠ  for the rice model becomes: 
*
* * * * *
*
   0    0    0    0
    0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
    0   0    0    0    0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
 0.53
1.00   1.61    -1.96   -0.71(4.90) 0.53 0.85
 -0.21
(-2.05)
  US TH VT INMLE
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.P P P P
αβ
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥′Π = = =
⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
* * *
* * * *
-1.04 -0.38
(6.60) (6.60) (-6.60) (-6.60)
-0.21 -0.34 0.41 0.15
(-2.13) (-2.13) (2.13) (2.13)
,
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
(4.5) 
where β  is normalized by the US price coefficient.  A comparison with original 
estimated coefficients in (4.1) shows that all insignificant parameters have dropped out of 

MLEΠ .   
The cointegrating vectorβ  from equation (4.5) defines the equilibrium error in 
the rice market for time t in terms of past values of individual prices as follows: 
. 1 . 1 . 1 . 1
1.61 1.96 0.71us t th t vt t in t tP P P P υ− − − −+ − − =    (4.6) 
 
This linear combination yields an equilibrium error, tυ  , whose expected value is zero.  
The system is temporarily in disequilibrium whenever  0tυ > , meaning arbitrage profits 
exist.  In the long run, adjustment of prices in the system will force tυ  to be zero, 
exhausting arbitrage profits and restoring the equilibrium. The magnitude of adjustment 
of individual country prices to restore equilibrium is given by the α vector in equation 
(4.5).  For example, the Indian adjustment coefficient of 0.21 means that Indian price 
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will decrease 21 percent of the disequilibrium value, in response to any exogenous 
changes in prices of all four countries. Vietnam has the largest price adjustment 
coefficient ( 31 0.53α = ).  Note that US and Thai prices do not respond to equilibrium 
error, which is consistent with price leadership established also in some earlier studies 
(Hellwinckel and Ugarte,  2003; Alaouze et. al, 1987; Bredahl and Green, 1983; Petzel 
and Monke, 1979; Barker and Herdt, 1985; Warr and Wollmer, 1997). 
The final long-run equilibrium/relationship for wheat prices,  MLEΠ , can be written 
as: 
*
* *
* *
*
* *
 0.05 1.34
(0.58)   (4.76)
 0.33 1.99
(2.24)   (4.51)
 0.25 0.43 1.00   -0.63    -
(4.50)   (2.56)
 0.03 1.14
(0.31)   (3.73)
 -0.60 1.50
(-4.50)  (3.71)
 
US AR CA AU IN
MLE
P P P P P
αβ
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
′Π = ⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
1.00       0     0.56
1.00       0      -0.50   -1.00     0 
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
   
* * *
* * * * *
* * * * *
* *
1.39 -0.03 -0.72 -1.34 0.03
(5.59) (-0.58) (-5.79) (-4.76) (0.58)
2.32 -0.21 -1.32 -1.99 0.19
(5.93) (-2.24) (-6.75) (-4.51) (2.24)
0.69 -0.16 -0.47 -0.43 0.14
(4.57) (-4.50) (-6.24) (-2.56) (4.50)
1.17 -0.02 -0.60 -1
=
*
* * * * *
.14 0.02
(4.32) (-0.31) (-4.43) (-3.73) (0.31)
0.90 0.38 -0.15 -1.50 -0.34
(2.50) (4.50) (-1.81) (-3.71) (-4.50)
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  (4.7) 
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Consider the cointegrating vectors, 1β and 2β , for the wheat model. Two equilibrium 
errors are defined as: 
. 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 1
. 1 . 1 . 1 2
0.63 0.56
0.50


us t ar t ca t in t t
us t ca t au t t
P P P P
P P P
υ
υ
− − − −
− − −
− − + =
− − =
 (4.8) 
In the case of more than one cointegrating vector, a representation of the co-movements 
can be very complicated, since equilibrium errors are not uniquely defined.  However, the 
first equality in equation (4.8) can be thought of as describing the comovement of prices 
between developed and developing countries, while the second defines price 
comovement within developed countries.  The first adjustment vector in equation (4.7) 
indicates that India has the highest adjustment parameter (-0.60), while it is Argentina for 
the second adjustment vector (1.99).  This implies that any external shock that leads to an 
equilibrium error can significantly change Argentinean and Indian wheat prices. 
 
5. IMPULSE RESPONSE ANALYSIS 
To further visualize the dynamic price relationships among the four (five) 
countries in the rice (wheat) market, we utilize an impulse response function based on the 
ECM in (2.1) but with the final, estimated long-run relationships in (4.5) and (4.7) 
(Bessler and Akelman, 1998; Yang, Bessler and Leatham, 2000).  Here, the response of 
current and future values of one variable in the system (e.g., Vietnam rice price) to a one-
standard deviation shock to one of the innovations (e.g., US rice price) are traced.  The 
presence of contemporaneous correlation among the corresponding innovations can 
 27
distort the calculation of impulse response functions because of the effects of innovations 
in another variable in the system at the same time. 
 Directed graphs, as given in Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (1993), provide an 
algorithm for directing causal flow of information between countries or within a market.  
The algorithm begins with a complete undirected graph, where innovations from each 
country are connected with innovations in every other country (figure 3, panel A).  The 
software TETRAD III (Spirtes et al., 2003), which contains the algorithm, removes edges 
when partial correlations are not statistically significant from zero and assigns causal 
flow directions for the remaining edges (figure 3, panel B).   
The directed graph results indicate that the causal structures of the four prices in 
the rice market are different from those of the five prices in the wheat market (figure 3, 
panel B and C).  The results from the rice market suggest that the changes in the US rice 
price directly affect that of Thailand, Vietnam and Indian prices.  Similarly, changes in 
Thailand (Vietnam) price directly affects prices of Vietnam and India (India).  Changes in 
Indian rice price, however, do not directly affect other prices in the system.  In the wheat 
market, again the changes in the US price have direct effects on all other prices followed 
by that of Argentina.  Canadian and Australian prices affect Indian prices, whose 
changes, as before, do not affect other prices in the system. 
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Figures 4 and 5 respectively present the impulse responses for the rice and wheat 
markets based on the ordering of innovations from directed graphs.  They incorporated 
both short-run dynamics ( Γmatrices in equation (2.1)) and long-run relationships 
(equations (4.5) and (4.7)).  In the case of the rice market, changes in the US price bring 
about relatively large responses in Thailand, Vietnam and Indian prices.  While Thailand 
and Vietnam prices increase immediately with the US price, the Indian price has a 
delayed response of up to 16 months.  Changes in Thailands price brings about an almost 
equal change in Vietnam and Indian price, but the response of US price is smaller 
consistent with weak exogeneity and directed graphs causal structure.  The Vietnam and 
Indian price changes have little effects on US and Thailands prices.  Although the effects 
of a shock from one country to other countries persisted in our 36-month responses, they 
eventually tended to zero. 
In the case of the wheat market, the large effects of changes in developed 
countries price on that of developing are clearly evident.  The US price changes bring 
about larger responses in Argentinean and Indian price relative to those in Canadian and 
Australian prices.   The Argentinean price change has relatively little effects on Canadian 
and Australian prices, while its effect on Indian price is slightly larger than that on the US 
price.   Australian and Canadian price changes bring about larger responses in the US, 
Argentinean and Indian prices.  The response to Indian price changes by the other four 
countries are less than their responses to developed countries price changes (e.g., Canada, 
Australia), but more than the Argentinean price effects.  It appears that the Canadian 
price is the most exogenous in the sense it responds less to changes in other countries 
 30
prices.  In general, a developed countrys price change has larger effects on other 
developed and developing countries.  The changes in developing countries prices bring 
about relatively lower responses in developed countries prices (e.g., Argentinean price 
change and Canadian response and vice versa). 
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study analyzed spatial price linkages between developed and developing 
countries in two key commodity markets long grain rice and hard wheat  during the 
post-Uruguay Round era using multivariate cointegration techniques.  For the long grain 
rice market, prices of the United States, Thailand, Vietnam and India are chosen.  The 
hard wheat market in this study included the United States, Canada, Australia Argentina 
and India. 
Results suggest that the prices of developed and developing countries are 
cointegrated, i.e., they exhibit a stable, long-run relationship during the post-Uruguay 
Round period.  We found two cointegrating vectors in the wheat market and both 
included all 5 prices.  In the rice market, only one cointegrating vector is identified, 
which included prices from all 4 countries.  Within the long-run relationship in rice 
prices, we did not find pairwise unit proportionality among the four countries.  In the case 
of wheat, unit proportionality is found between developed countries prices, but not found 
for any pair involving one each of developed and developing countries.  These results 
confirm partial integration between developed and developing countries in rice and wheat 
markets.  The dramatic decline in commodity prices and the accompanied increase in 
protection and/or domestic support in several countries during late 1990s might be a 
reason for our results. 
Additional tests suggest that the US and Thai rice prices are weakly exogenous in 
the sense that they do not adjust their respective prices to stay in the long-run 
relationship,  
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i.e., price leadership.  Instead, Vietnam and Indian prices adjust to restore the long-run 
relationship.  An impulse response analysis aided by directed graphs on the causal flow 
of information among the four prices confirmed US and Thailands price leadership.  
Changes in the prices of leaders, especially that of the US, have relatively large effects on 
Vietnam and Indian rice prices.  For the wheat market, the adjustment parameters from 
the two cointegrating vectors suggest that all countries prices adjust to any shock to the 
long-run relationship.  However, in the first cointegrating vector, Argentinean price 
adjusts most to perturbations in the long-run price linkage, while the Indian price adjusts 
the most to any changes in price relationship illustrated by the second cointegrating 
vector.   In the case of the wheat market, the relatively large effects of changes in 
developed countries price on that of developing are clearly evident from the impulse 
response analysis. 
To conclude, developed and developing country prices in rice and wheat markets 
are linked imperfectly, but in most instances the changes in the prices of the former lead 
to significant adjustments in those of the latter group.  Developing countries, especially 
new entrants into world rice and wheat markets (Vietnam and Argentina, respectively) 
have faced significant price adjustment especially during the post-Uruguay Round period.   
Rapid and large adjustment of developing countries prices to changes emanating from 
other countries would certainly affect price stability, income and welfare of their 
agricultural households.  Risk-averse producers in developing countries would respond to 
the higher and fast adjustment (variability) of prices by reducing supply, which may 
erode their international export competitiveness.  In some cases, the falling prices may 
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force sustenance farmers to leave agriculture and aid in the consolidation of farm assets.  
The livelihood of the relatively low-skilled labor out of agriculture would then depend 
crucially on the capacity of non-farm sectors to productively employ these resources.  If 
these countries excessively depend on rice or wheat for foreign exchange, external 
changes passed through the long-run price linkage with other markets could potentially 
impact their exchange rate and the non-farm sectors.  A better understanding of the 
sources of price changes in developed countries, i.e., demand- or supply- (productivity-) 
or policy-based, is necessary since the Peace clause of the URAA expired earlier this 
year.  There is the possibility that the changes in the developed countries prices can be 
interpreted as policy impacts, especially by developing countries.  Such interpretations 
would probably lead to more protection/support moving away from a multilateral 
commitment to reform agriculture and alleviate poverty.  
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APPENDIX 1:  DICKEY-FULLER AND AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER UNIT 
ROOT TEST RESULTS 
 
 
The unit root tests suggest that the US, Thai, Vietnamese, and India rice prices are 
non-stationary in level (table A1, top panel). For wheat, the tests indicate that the US, 
Argentinean, Canadian, and Australian prices have unit roots in level. The result of the 
tests for Indian wheat price is inconclusive. That is, the ADFγ  indicates rejecting the 
hypothesis of non-stationarity in level at 0.05α = , while the tDF , DFγ , and tADF  
statistics suggest the opposite. Since the ADFγ  test is considered a more restrictive test 
(Granger and Newbold, 1986), the conclusion here is that the Indian price is non-
stationary in level as well.  
First differences of prices are then tested for unit roots (table A1, bottom panel). 
The four test statistics indicate the first differenced data of rice and wheat prices are 
stationary; i.e., I(0). Therefore, we conclude that every price series in our sample is I(1), 
which is a prerequisite for the multivariate cointegration analysis.* 
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Table A1Dickey-Fuller Unit roots test in levels and first differences 
 
 
Test
Statistics
Rice prices:/1
     U.S. -1.60 (F) -6.62 (F) -1.47 (F) -6.67 (F) -7.82 (R) -61.91 (R) -3.61 (R) -54.69 (R)
     Thailand -1.54 (F) -5.09 (F) -1.82 (F) -6.17 (F) -5.67 (R) -44.69 (R) -5.25 (R) -61.32 (R)
     Vietnam -1.40 (F) -4.31 (F) -1.87 (F) -6.07 (F) -5.92 (R) -46.52 (R) -3.89 (R) -45.64 (R)
     India -1.47 (F) -4.10 (F) -1.92 (F) -5.46 (F) -5.37 (R) -41.21 (R) -4.42 (R) -48.75 (R)
Wheat price:/2
     U.S. -1.69 (F) -5.64 (F) -1.76 (F) -6.09 (F) -8.97 (R) -104.33 (R) -5.29 (R) -138.79 (R)
     Argentina -1.96 (F) -7.71 (F) -1.97 (F) -8.54 (F) -9.02 (R) -105.26 (R) -5.91 (R) -161.30 (R)
     Canada -1.92 (F) -7.37 (F) -1.86 (F) -7.71 (F) -10.73 (R) -129.37 (R) -5.52 (R) -161.59 (R)
     Australia -1.67 (F) -5.50 (F) -1.82 (F) -6.21 (F) -8.92 (R) -103.32 (R) -4.76 (R) -125.66 (R)
     India/3 -3.56 (F)/3 -17.58 (F) -3.59 (F)/3 -30.74 (R) -8.73 (R) -73.83 (R) -5.04 (R) -104.99 (R)
Level
DF t DFγ ADF t ADFγ 
First difference
DF t DFγ ADF t ADFγ 
 
1For rice data at sample size, T =50, critical values for DFt and ADFt are -3.50 and for DFγ       and ADFγ 
are -19.7 at α=0.5.  
2For wheat data at sample size, T =100, critical values for DFt and ADFt are -3.45 and for DFγ and 
ADFγ are -20.6 at α=0.5. (Fuller, 1976, p.373; 1996, Table 10.A.2) 
3Conclusions based on critical value of DFt and ADFt for T=50 at α=0.025, which is -3.69.   
*In fact, not all price series should be I(1) as is often incorrectly assumed.  Cointegration tests can be 
carried out so long as two of the variables in the system are I(1). However, the trace test will not identify 
cointegration between series of different order.  
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APPENDIX 2: DETERMINISTIC COMPONENTS AND LAG LENGTH OF 
THE ECM 
 
I.  Lag Length of the ECM 
The ECM is specified with six lags for the rice and wheat models.  The choice on 
lag length is based on (i) Residual Analysis, (ii)  Likelihood ratio test, and (iii) 
eigenvalues of companion matrices. 
(i)  The residual analysis is carried out using the Shenton-Bowman test for normality.  
Residuals from rice and wheat ECMs with six lags generated white noise 
residuals (table A2.1). The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test suggests that the wheat 
model with seven lags yields serially correlated residuals. 
Table A2.1Rice and Wheat Multivariate Test Statistics for Residual Analysis 
 
Lag 
Length
k=2 12.02 (0.74) 14.8 (0.54) 64.73 (0.00) 41.73 (0.02) 18.50 (0.82) 35.59 (0.00)
k=3 11.11 (0.80) 18.32 (0.31) 66.36 (0.00) 17.94 (0.84) 18.41 (0.82) 50.14 (0.00)
k=4 12.29 (0.72) 20.07 (0.22) 57.57 (0.00) 21.58 (0.66) 23.39 (0.55) 39.90 (0.00)
k=5 16.28 (0.43) 14.36 (0.57) 62.80 (0.00) 34.89 (0.09) 20.71 (0.71) 19.31 (0.04)
k=6 12.17 (0.73) 18.82 (0.28) 21.31 (0.008) 20.73 (0.71) 28.73 (0.28) 11.66 (0.31)
k=7 - - - - - - 33.33 (0.09) 32.89 (0.09) 10.30 (0.41)
LM(1) LM(4) Shenton-Bow man StatLM(1) LM(4) Shenton-Bow man Stat
Test for Normality
Wheat ModelRice Model
Test for Autocorrelation Test for NormalityTest for Autocorrelation
 
p-values are in parentheses 
 
(ii)  Whether or not the omission of a lag induces a significant loss of fit in the ECM is 
verified by a LR test.  Table A2.2 shows that omitting the sixth lag, indeed, 
induces a significant loss of fit. 
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Table A2.2Log-likelihood ratio for misspecification test 
 
Lag Length lnL(k) Ho:π6 =0 lnL(k) Ho:π6 =0
k=6 596.96 ln[L(5)/L(6)] = 28.62 (R) 841.60 ln[L(5)/L(6)] = 76.15
k=5 582.65 803.53
wheat modelrice models
 
For rice models, 216χ  at α = 0.05 is 26.3 and for wheat models, 
2
25χ  at α = 0.05 is 37.65 
 
 
(iii) Whenever the eigenvalues of companion matrices are bounded by the unit circle, 
the corresponding ECM is said to be stable (Johansen, 1995).  The model with six 
and seven lags respectively for the rice and wheat models satisfies this criterion 
(figure A2.1).  However, the model with six lags is chosen for the wheat market to 
avoid serially correlated residuals (table A2.1) 
 
Figure A2. 1Eigenvalues of Companion Matrices 
 
 
II.  Deterministic components of the ECM 
A presence of a linear trend in the VAR, which is equivalent to an intercept term 
in the ECM is confirmed using the LR test.  Let the absence of a trend (intercept) in the 
VAR (ECM) be denoted by the hypothesis *2H .  Testing 
*
2 ( 1)H r ≤ against 2 ( 1)H r ≤ for the 
rice model yields: 
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*4
*
2 2
2
(1 )2ln ; ( 1) | ( 1) ln 28.08 14.66 13.42(1 )
i
i i
Q H r H r T λ
λ=
⎧ ⎫−⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤− = = ≡ − = − =⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦ −⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑ . 
For the wheat data, testing *2 ( 2)H r ≤ against 2 ( 2)H r ≤  yields: 
 
*5
*
2 2
3
(1 )2ln ; ( 2) | ( 2) ln 33 17.8 15.19(1 )
i
i i
Q H r H r T λ
λ=
⎧ ⎫−⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤− = = ≡ − = − =⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦ −⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑ . 
Both tests reject the null hypothesis at 0.05α = 2(3,0.95)( 7.81)χ = suggesting the inclusion of 
an intercept term in the respective ECMs (case I, table 1). 
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